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Managing the transition to a safer ﬁ  nancial system
SHEILA C. BAIR
Chairman
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The current ﬁ  nancial crisis demonstrates the need for changes in the supervision and resolution of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, especially those that are systemically important to the ﬁ  nancial system. The challenge is to 
ﬁ  nd ways to impose greater market discipline on these ﬁ  rms by giving them incentives to reduce their 
size and complexity through capital standards, leverage limits, systemic risk insurance premia and other 
measures. Foremost in the reform agenda is the need for a special legal framework to ensure the orderly 
resolution of a complex ﬁ  nancial institution. There must also be incentives to protect consumer interests, 
as there can no longer be any doubt that abusive products and practices pose threats to the safety and 
soundness of the ﬁ  nancial system.
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W
e are in the midst of the most challenging 
ﬁ  nancial crisis since the Great Depression. 
Many financial organisations, both 
supervised and unsupervised, have grown in size 
and complexity to the point that they have become 
sources of systemic risk. The increasing complexity of 
ﬁ  nancial products and frequently opaque marketing 
and disclosure practices have also been revealed to 
pose serious risks for consumers, institutions, and 
investors. The widespread economic damage that 
has been wrought from this ﬁ  nancial crisis has called 
into question the fundamental assumptions regarding 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and their supervision that have 
directed our regulatory efforts for decades.
This article will examine some steps that can be taken 
to reduce systemic vulnerabilities by strengthening 
regulation and supervision and improving ﬁ  nancial 
market transparency.
First and foremost, should be the creation of a new 
special resolution authority for systemically important 
non-bank ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. Changes in regulation and 
supervision are also needed to give ﬁ  rms incentives 
to limit their size and complexity. Equally important, 
there must be new incentives created to protect 
consumer interests, as there can no longer be any 
doubt that abusive products and practices endanger 
the safety and soundness of the ﬁ  nancial system.
1| THE CRISIS UNFOLDS
The past two years have brought extraordinary changes to 
ﬁ  nancial markets. What began with an announcement of 
losses for two investment funds managed by Bear Stearns 
in June 2007 has progressed into the most challenging 
ﬁ  nancial crisis since the Great Depression. A cascade 
of downgrades closed the securitisation and structured 
credit markets and created a funding crisis for ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries. Credit losses have weakened investor 
conﬁ  dence and frozen liquidity in all but the most 
transparent of markets. By the end of 2007, the ﬁ  nancial 
stress was clearly evident as bank failures increased 
and the Federal Reserve announced unprecedented 
measures to inject liquidity into US markets.
As 2008 unfolded, conditions in the mortgage and 
other markets continued to deteriorate. In March, 
Bear Stearns was acquired by JPMorgan Chase (with 
assistance by the Federal Reserve), and in July, 
IndyMac Bank, which had over USD 30 billion in 
assets, was closed and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) was appointed conservator of 
the successor institution. The failure is the most 
costly in the history of the FDIC.1 Waning investor 
conﬁ  dence forced Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
into conservatorship, Lehman Brothers to ﬁ  le for 
bankruptcy protection, insurance giant AIG to seek 
and obtain USD 85 billion under a temporary liquidity 
facility from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
and the FDIC to invoke the ﬁ  rst use of the systemic 
risk exception.2 Immediately following the Lehman 
bankruptcy, liquidity in the inter-bank market 
evaporated. In response, the US Treasury instituted 
temporary guarantees for money market mutual 
funds and the Federal Reserve expedited approval 
of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley applications 
to become bank holding companies.
Congress responded by passing the Emergency 
Economic Stabilisation Act (EESA) in October, which 
funded the US Treasury’s Temporary Asset Relief 
Program (TARP). That program immediately recapitalised 
nine of the largest bank holding companies (BHCs) 
in the United States and has since invested capital in 
numerous other banks. The EESA also temporarily 
increased the deposit insurance limit to USD 250,000. 
The Federal Reserve opened several new lending 
facilities to provide funding using asset-backed securities 
as collateral. The FDIC established the Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program, which guarantees bank 
debt in order to improve bank liquidity. The newest 
program established by the US Treasury uses the 
FDIC and the Federal Reserve to provide guarantees 
to the private sector for the purchase of legacy loans 
and securities, respectively.3
During the current crisis, many countries in the 
European Union as well as the United States have had 
to develop ad hoc responses and use public funds to 
address problems in their large, troubled institutions. 
The European Union has raised minimum deposit 
insurance levels, allowed governments to guarantee 
1  The FDIC estimated that losses to the deposit insurance fund from the IndyMac Bank failure would total approximately USD 11 billion.
2  By law, the FDIC is required to resolve a failed bank using the resolution method that is least costly to the deposit insurance fund. A systemic risk exception to the 
least-cost test was established for extraordinary circumstances when the least-cost method would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or ﬁ  nancial 
stability. The systemic risk exception requires approval of two thirds of the members of the FDIC Board of Directors, two thirds of the members of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of the US Treasury, who must ﬁ  rst consult with the President of the United States. As of March 31, 2009, 
the FDIC has invoked the systemic risk exception on four occasions during this ﬁ  nancial crisis.
3  For information on programs created to address the current crisis, see http://www.ﬁ  nancialstability.gov/. 
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short-term bank debt and recapitalise fundamentally 
sound banks. For example, Belgian authorities have 
rescued several banks by injecting capital and by 
guaranteeing all new loans of their banks considered 
to be systemic. The French government announced a 
plan to provide loan guarantees and may buy stakes 
in banks in need of capital. The German government 
announced a stabilisation fund to provide banks with 
capital support and to purchase troubled assets. In the 
United Kingdom, the Bank of England announced plans 
to swap banks’ risky mortgage assets for government 
debt, provided recapitalisation assistance, and loaned 
funds to banks through liquidity auctions.
Clearly, government efforts to stabilise the ﬁ  nancial 
system both in the United States and in Europe have 
resulted in an unprecedented broadening of the safety 
net beyond its traditional role. These actions have 
been justiﬁ  ed by the need to prevent the failure of 
individual institutions from shutting down ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation channels, which otherwise would have 
had severe systemic repercussions on the global ﬁ  nancial 
system and the real economy. Economic and ﬁ  nancial 
integration has reached a level where no country 
can ignore developments elsewhere in the world.
The ﬁ  nancial crisis is ongoing and central banks 
and regulatory agencies are fully engaged in efforts 
to restore investor conﬁ  dence and restart ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation.
Beyond these pressing challenges is the broader 
question of how best to oversee the ﬁ  nancial system, 
particularly the largest ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms that can pose 
systemic risk. In the United States, attention is being 
focused on ﬁ  nancial system changes and reforms 
that will promote ﬁ  nancial stability and reduce our 
vulnerabilities to systemic risk.
2| THE FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND 
FINANCIAL RISK
Financial markets channel funds between savers 
and investors either directly through capital markets 
or indirectly through ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. 
Traditionally, consumers have relied on regulated 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, such as commercial banks and 
thrifts to provide mortgages and other retail loans, 
on broker-dealers for securities and other investment 
vehicles and on insurance companies for insurance 
and surety products. In more recent times, various 
non-bank entities, which are subject to widely varying 
ranges of regulation or even no regulation, have 
become important participants in the ﬁ  nancial services 
markets. The largest ﬁ  nancial institutions have grown 
rapidly in size and complexity, fueled in part by the 
elimination of Glass-Steagall and other regulatory 
restrictions. While there are still large numbers of 
traditional ﬁ  nancial institutions, a number of very 
large ﬁ  nancial conglomerates engage in a broad 
range of activities and have become increasingly 
interconnected.
The decade preceding the current crisis was 
characterised by a rapid expansion in credit and by 
uncharacteristically low interest rates and credit 
spreads. In an effort to reap greater returns, credit 
was made available to ever-more-risky borrowers 
and narrow credit spreads were offset by increasing 
leverage. To manage the risk posed by these borrowers 
and to facilitate the leverage needed to generate 
desired returns, the ﬁ  nancial markets developed 
increasingly complex ﬁ  nancial products intended to 
reduce risk by shifting that risk to those best able to 
bear it. Leverage was increased by funding credits 
off-balance-sheet through securitisations and special 
purpose entities. The mix of reduced underwriting 
standards and increased leverage rapidly expanded 
credit and ultimately pushed up the values of 
equities, commodities, and especially real estate to 
unsustainable levels.
Once the bubble burst, the decline in the price 
of housing led to a large-scale downgrade in the 
ratings of subprime mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralised debt obligations that were linked to these 
securities. Ultimately, these losses caused failure or 
distress in a number of ﬁ  nancial institutions that were 
over-exposed to this market.
The US ﬁ  nancial regulatory system failed in many 
instances to appreciate the gravity of the situation and 
subsequently did not limit risk properly. This was partly 
because the prevailing belief that ﬁ  nancial markets, 
through ﬁ  nancial engineering, had created a system 
where risks were easily identiﬁ  ed and transferred from 
parties who were risk averse to those who were willing, 
ready and capable to assume these risks. The collapse 
of these markets calls these beliefs into question.
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What began as well-understood, risk-reducing 
transactions between two parties, became in the 
aggregate, opaque risky transactions when they 
were multiplied many times over and conducted 
between multiple parties. The unprecedented size and 
complexity of many of today’s ﬁ  nancial institutions 
and ﬁ  nancial products have raised serious issues 
regarding whether they can be properly managed and 
effectively supervised through existing mechanisms 
and techniques. In addition, the signiﬁ  cant size and 
growth of unsupervised ﬁ  nancial activities outside the 
traditional banking system —in what is termed the 
shadow ﬁ  nancial system— has made it increasingly 
difﬁ  cult for regulators or market participants to 
understand the real dynamics of either bank credit 
markets or public capital markets.4
US regulators already have broad powers to supervise 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and markets and to limit many 
of the activities that undermined our ﬁ  nancial system. 
For various reasons, these powers were not used 
effectively and, as a consequence, supervision was 
not sufﬁ  ciently proactive. Insufﬁ  cient attention was 
paid to the adequacy of complex institutions’ risk 
management capabilities. Too much reliance 
was placed on mathematical models to drive risk 
management decisions. Off-balance-sheet vehicles 
were permitted to be operated beyond the reach 
of prudential regulation, effectively avoiding bank 
and holding company capital requirements in the 
United States. Perhaps most importantly, failure to 
ensure that ﬁ  nancial products were appropriate and 
sustainable for consumers caused signiﬁ  cant problems 
not only for those consumers but for the safety and 
soundness of ﬁ  nancial institutions.
Problems of supervising large, complex ﬁ  nancial 
institutions are compounded by the absence of 
procedures and structures to effectively resolve those 
institutions in an orderly fashion outside the normal 
bankruptcy process. Unlike the clearly deﬁ  ned and 
proven special statutory powers that the FDIC has 
for resolving insured depository institutions, the 
current US bankruptcy framework was not designed 
to protect the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system.
3| ADDRESSING SYSTEMIC RISK
Having a mechanism for the orderly resolution of 
institutions that pose a systemic risk to the ﬁ  nancial 
system is critical. Creating a resolution regime that could 
apply to any ﬁ  nancial institution that becomes a source 
of systemic risk should be an urgent priority. Beyond 
the necessity of having an orderly resolution regime 
for systemically important ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, additional 
changes in our regulatory and supervisory approach are 
clearly warranted. Changes that ﬁ  ll regulatory voids and 
improve cooperation should be implemented quickly.
3|1 Resolution  of  systemically 
important ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms
In a typical bank failure, where the bank and the BHC 
are smaller and not engaged in complex capital-market 
operations, the FDIC steps in to resolve the bank 
under its special authorities. The FDIC has only the 
authority to take control of the failing bank, protecting 
the insured depositors. Because the bank is typically 
the only signiﬁ  cant asset of the BHC and most of 
the holding company’s operations reside within the 
bank, seizing the bank and separating it from its 
BHC is simple and efﬁ  cient. Taking over the bank 
usually renders the holding company insolvent, and 
forces it into the bankruptcy process. When most of 
the important functions of the bank are within the 
bank or bank subsidiaries, the FDIC can resolve the 
institution through its normal practices.
However, there are two problems the FDIC confronts 
in trying to resolve larger, more complex holding 
companies. The ﬁ  rst concerns how to deal with a 
non-bank holding company subsidiary whose operations 
are essential to the day-to-day operations of the bank. 
The second is how to prevent a systemically important 
holding company from declaring bankruptcy. So 
although the FDIC has the power to resolve any 
failed bank, it is often impossible to accomplish this 
in the case of a bank within a large complex BHC.
4  This shadow ﬁ  nancial system includes unregulated ﬁ  nancial instruments, such as over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and off-balance-sheet entities including 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs), and non-bank institutions, such as hedge funds and private equity funds. See, Congressional Oversight Panel, Special Report 
on Regulatory Reform, Washington DC, 2009, p. 28. 
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Large complex BHCs, as well as a number of other 
large non-bank ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, engage in operations 
that pose systemic risk to the ﬁ  nancial system. 
If one of these entities becomes troubled, there 
is no alternative resolution mechanism outside 
of bankruptcy. A bankruptcy ﬁ  ling would trigger 
the close-out and netting provisions of the BHCs 
derivatives contracts.
In a bankruptcy, an automatic stay is placed on most 
creditor claims, which imposes a time-out to prevent 
the untimely and inefﬁ  cient liquidation of assets. 
The automatic stay creates liquidity problems for 
creditors, as they must wait to receive their funds. 
The enforceability of contractual rights to terminate 
and net speciﬁ  ed ﬁ  nancial contracts (futures and 
options contracts and certain types of derivatives), 
however, remain exceptions to the normal bankruptcy 
process. This carve-out for speciﬁ  ed ﬁ  nancial contracts 
creates a “rush to the door” as counterparties invoke 
their netting and settling arrangements, leaving 
fewer assets available to settle other creditor claims. 
These exceptions are designed to preserve ﬁ  nancial 
stability by limiting the failure of one bank from 
affecting its healthy counterparties. However, during 
periods of market instability the immediate close-out 
and netting of speciﬁ  ed ﬁ  nancial contracts can 
overwhelm the market and depress market prices 
for the underlying assets.
By contrast, the powers that are available to the 
FDIC under its special resolution authority prevent 
ﬁ  nancial contracts of an insured depository institution 
from being automatically terminated and netted. 
The FDIC has 24 hours after its appointment as 
receiver to decide whether to transfer the contracts 
to another bank or to an FDIC-operated bridge bank. 
As a result, the potential for instability or contagion 
from immediate termination and netting can be 
tempered by transferring the ﬁ  nancial contracts to a 
more stable counterparty. Such a temporary delay on 
close-out is explicitly ruled out in other jurisdictions, 
including the European Union.
The consequences of a large systemic ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm 
ﬁ  ling for bankruptcy protection are aptly demonstrated 
by the Lehman Brothers experience. In the case of 
Lehman, the bankruptcy ﬁ  ling triggered the close-out 
and netting of Lehman’s ﬁ  nancial contracts. This was 
only avoided in the case of Bear Stearns, because the 
Federal Reserve lent USD 30 billion to JPMorgan Chase 
to acquire the company. The acquisition allowed the 
contracts to transfer to a counterparty. Once Lehman 
sought the protection of the bankruptcy court (Chapter 11) 
—a clear insolvency event— close-out and netting 
applied. Because of Lehman’s signiﬁ  cant size, the 
bankruptcy resulted in the freezing of global credit 
markets. This effect was compounded as creditors 
realised that a “too big to fail” institution had failed. 
The differences in outcomes from the handling of 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers demonstrate 
that authorities have no real alternative but to avoid 
the bankruptcy process in the case of systemically 
important ﬁ  rms. When the public interest is at stake, 
the resolution process should support an orderly 
unwinding of the institution in a way that protects 
the broader economic and taxpayer interests, not 
just private ﬁ  nancial interests.
3|2  Creating a new resolution regime
In creating a new resolution regime, the roles and 
responsibilities must be clearly deﬁ  ned and care 
must be taken to avoid creating new conﬂ  icts of 
interest. In the case of banks, Congress gave the 
FDIC backup supervisory authority and the power 
to self-appoint as receiver, recognising there might 
be conﬂ  icts between a primary regulator’s prudential 
responsibilities and its willingness to recognise when an 
institution it supervises needs to be closed. Thus, the 
new resolution authority should be independent of 
the new systemic risk regulator.
This new authority should also be designed to limit 
subsidies to private investors, that is to limit moral 
hazard. If ﬁ  nancial assistance outside of the resolution 
process is granted to systemically important ﬁ  rms, 
the process should be open, transparent and subject 
to a system of checks and balances that are in the 
systemic-risk exception to the least-cost test that 
applies to insured ﬁ  nancial institutions. No single 
government entity should be able to unilaterally trigger 
a resolution strategy outside the deﬁ  ned parameters 
of the established resolution process.
Clear guidelines for this process are needed and must 
be adhered to in order to gain investor conﬁ  dence 
and protect public and private interests. This will 
require careful thought. The guidelines should 
have enough ﬂ  exibility to accommodate unforeseen 
situations, while promoting conﬁ  dence in the outcome. 
For example, there should be a clearly deﬁ  ned priority 
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banks and thrifts. Without a system that provides 
for the orderly resolution of activities outside of the 
depository institution, the failure of a systemically 
important holding company or non-bank ﬁ  nancial 
entity will create additional instability as claims 
outside the depository institution become completely 
illiquid under the current system.
3|3 Systemic  risk  regulator
In addition to calling for a resolution regime for 
institutions that pose a systemic risk to the ﬁ  nancial 
system, many studies are now calling for the 
creation of a systemic risk regulator that would add 
a macroprudential approach to regulation.6 In the 
United States, arguments have been put forth for the 
creation of a systemic risk regulator to address key 
ﬂ  aws in the current supervisory system. According 
to the proposals, this new regulator would be tasked 
with monitoring large or rapidly increasing exposures 
—such as subprime mortgages and collateralised 
debt obligations— across ﬁ  rms and markets, rather 
than only at the level of individual ﬁ  rms or sectors. 
The regulator would also analyse possible spillovers 
among ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms or between ﬁ  rms and markets, 
such as the mutual exposures of highly interconnected 
ﬁ  rms. Additionally, the proposals call for such a 
regulator to have the authority to obtain information and 
examine banks and key ﬁ  nancial market participants, 
including non-bank ﬁ  nancial institutions that may 
not be currently subject to regulation. Finally, the 
systemic risk regulator would be responsible for setting 
standards for capital, liquidity, and risk management 
practices for the ﬁ  nancial sector.
Although there could be beneﬁ  ts in creating a systemic 
risk regulator, it is far from clear that a systemic risk 
regulator alone would be able to prevent a future 
crisis. Creation of such a regulator presumes that the 
ﬁ  nancial system would continue to be characterised by 
a number of large, complex ﬁ  nancial institutions. In the 
long run, however, we cannot hope that management 
of these large systemically important ﬁ  rms and their 
systemic risk regulator will always develop the right 
strategy at the right time. Financial institutions should 
be discouraged from becoming so large or complex 
structure for settling claims, depending on the type of 
ﬁ  rm.5 Any resolution should be subject to a cost test 
to minimise public loss and impose losses according 
to the established claims priority. Additionally, the 
process must allow continuation of any systemically 
signiﬁ  cant operations. The rules that govern the 
process, and set priorities for the imposition of losses 
on shareholders and creditors should be clearly 
articulated and closely adhered to so that the markets 
can understand the resolution process and anticipate 
the outcome with some conﬁ  dence.
The FDIC’s authority to act as receiver and to establish 
a bridge bank in order to maintain key functions and 
sell assets offers a good model. A bridge bank allows 
the government to preserve systemically signiﬁ  cant 
functions. It enables losses to be imposed on market 
players who should appropriately bear the risk. 
It also creates the possibility of multiple bidders for 
the bank and its assets, which can reduce losses to 
the receivership.
The FDIC has the authority to terminate contracts upon 
an insured depository institution’s failure, including 
contracts with senior management whose services are 
no longer required. Through its repudiation powers, 
as well as enforcement powers, termination of such 
management contracts can often be accomplished 
at little cost to the FDIC. Moreover, when the FDIC 
establishes a bridge bank, it is able to contract with 
individuals to serve in senior management positions 
at the bridge institution subject to the oversight of 
the FDIC. The new resolution authority should be 
granted similar statutory authorities.
While many details of a special resolution authority 
for systemically important ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms would 
have to be worked out, a new systemic resolution 
regime could be funded by fees or assessments 
charged to systemically important ﬁ  rms. In addition, 
consistent with the FDIC’s powers with regard to 
insured institutions, the resolution authority should 
have backup supervisory authority over those ﬁ  rms 
which it may have to resolve.
There is clearly a need for a special resolution regime, 
outside the bankruptcy process, for ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms that 
pose a systemic risk, just as there is for commercial 
5  Questions will arise concerning what types of ﬁ  nancial products should receive priority. For example, would insurance policies, annuities or other consumer contracts 
be given priority as is the case with insured deposits?
6  See J. de Larosière, “The high-level group report on ﬁ  nancial supervision in the EU”.
  See also, The G30, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability, Washington DC, 15 January 2009. 
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that they pose a systemic risk to the ﬁ  nancial system 
and the economy. Instead, we should promote a 
system that does not depend on the behaviour of 
managers or their regulators. Rather, the system 
should be designed so that the failure of one of the 
largest ﬁ  nancial institutions has little or no effect on 
the other parts of the system. In order to move in 
this direction, we need to create incentives that limit 
the size and complexity of institutions whose failure 
would otherwise pose a systemic risk.
3|4  Limiting risk by limiting size 
and complexity
Over the past two decades, a number of arguments 
have been advanced about why ﬁ  nancial organisations 
should be allowed to become larger and more 
complex. These reasons include being able to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope, diversify 
risk across a broad range of markets and products, 
and gain access to global capital markets.
It was alleged that the increased size and complexity 
of these resulting organisations could be effectively 
managed using new innovations in quantitative risk 
management techniques. Not only did institutions 
claim that they could manage their complex 
structures, they also argued that the combination 
of diversiﬁ  cation and advanced risk management 
practices would allow them to operate with markedly 
lower capital buffers than were necessary in smaller, 
less-sophisticated institutions. Indeed many of these 
concepts were inherent in the Basel II Advanced 
Approaches, resulting in reduced capital requirements 
for these banks. In hindsight, it is now clear that 
the international regulatory community relied too 
heavily on the supposed beneﬁ  ts of diversiﬁ  cation 
and modern risk management practices when setting 
minimum regulatory capital requirements for large 
complex ﬁ  nancial institutions.
Notwithstanding expectations and industry projections 
for gains in ﬁ  nancial efﬁ  ciencies, economies of scale 
seem to be reached at levels far below the size of 
today’s largest ﬁ  nancial institutions.7 Also, efforts 
designed to realise economies of scope have not 
lived up to their promise.8 In some instances, the 
complex institutional combinations permitted by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) legislation were unwound 
because they failed to realise anticipated economies 
of scope.9 Studies of the economies produced by 
increased scale and scope have consistently found 
that most banks could improve their cost efﬁ  ciency 
more by concentrating their efforts on reducing 
operational inefﬁ  ciencies than through growth.10
There also are limits to the ability to diversify 
risk using securitisation, structured ﬁ  nance and 
derivatives. No one disputes that there are beneﬁ  ts 
to diversification for smaller and less-complex 
institutions, but as institutions become larger 
and more complex, the ability to diversify risk is 
diminished. When a ﬁ  nancial system includes a small 
number of very large complex organisations, the 
system cannot be well-diversiﬁ  ed. As institutions 
grow in size and importance, they not only take 
on a risk proﬁ  le that mirrors the risk of the market 
and general economic conditions, but they also 
concentrate risk as they become the only important 
counterparties to many transactions that facilitate 
ﬁ  nancial intermediation in the economy.11 The fallacy 
of the diversiﬁ  cation argument becomes apparent 
in the midst of ﬁ  nancial crisis when these large 
complex ﬁ  nancial organisations —because they are 
so interconnected— reveal themselves as a source 
of risk in the system.
7  Boyd and Graham (1998) examined the effects of mergers and found evidence of cost-efﬁ  ciency gains for only the smallest of banks. The gains disappeared quickly 
with increases in size and were negative for larger banks.
8  A number of studies have found little or no evidence of scope economies. Among these are Stiroh (2004), Amel et al. (2002), and DeLong (2001). For thorough 
discussions of the literature on the effects of consolidation in banking, see Jones and Critchﬁ  eld (2005) and Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999).
9  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernisation Act of 1999 eliminated restrictions on the mixing of commercial and investment banking, and insurance that 
had been in effect since 1933. 
10  Reviewing this literature, Kwan (1997) observed that efﬁ  ciency appeared to vary substantially across banks and that: “On average, the deviation from the minimum 
cost is found to be quite large, in the neighborhood of 20 to 25 percent of total costs, and it seems to dominate the effect of scale inefﬁ  ciency. The ﬁ  ndings suggest 
that for an average bank, the biggest room for efﬁ  ciency gains lies in improving its operating efﬁ  ciency, that is, doing things right, rather than on scale efﬁ  ciency, 
that is, being the right size.”
11  G10, 2001, Consolidation in the ﬁ  nancial sector: working group, Report to the Governors of the Group of Ten. See also, De Nicolo and Kwast (2002).
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3|5  Incentives to limit size: 
focus on capital adequacy
One suggestion for controlling the size and complexity 
of systemically important ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms is to impose 
increasing ﬁ  nancial obligations that mirror their 
heightened risk. Therefore, we should revisit the 
capital standards faced by these ﬁ  rms.
Obviously, those systemically important ﬁ  rms that 
are not subject to regulatory capital standards should 
be made subject to them. Additionally, the current 
capital standards under the Basel II Accord are not 
sufﬁ  cient to reﬂ  ect the risk inherent in today’s 
systemically important ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms —all ﬁ  rms 
should face a minimum leverage ratio. Moreover, 
additional capital charges should be imposed based 
on both size and complexity. Regulators should 
not only increase required capital, but should also 
judge the capital adequacy of these ﬁ  rms, taking into 
account off-balance-sheet assets and conduits as if 
these risks were on the balance sheet.
At present, regulatory capital standards do not 
explicitly consider the stage of the economic 
cycle in which ﬁ  nancial institutions are operating. 
As institutions seek to improve returns on equity, 
there is often an incentive to reduce capital and 
increase leverage when economic conditions are 
favorable and earnings are strong. However, when a 
downturn inevitably occurs and losses arising from 
credit and market risk exposures increase, these 
institutions’ capital ratios may fall to levels that no 
longer appropriately support their risk proﬁ  les.
Therefore, it is important for regulators to institute 
counter-cyclical capital policies. For example, ﬁ  nancial 
institutions could be required to limit dividends in 
proﬁ  table times to build capital above regulatory 
minimums or build some type of regulatory capital 
buffer to cover estimated through-the-cycle credit 
losses in excess of those reﬂ  ected in their loan loss 
allowances under current accounting standards. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is 
working to strengthen capital to ensure bank resilience 
to future episodes of economic and ﬁ  nancial stress. 
The FDIC also strongly encourages the accounting 
standard-setters to revise the existing accounting 
model for loan losses to better reﬂ  ect the economics 
of lending activity and enable lenders to recognize 
credit impairment earlier in the credit cycle.
A ﬁ  nal area of consideration in the United States 
is to subject large systemically important ﬁ  rms to 
higher Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) limits.12 
When PCA standards were ﬁ  rst implemented they 
were designed for regulators to take action against 
a troubled ﬁ  nancial institution before it became 
critically undercapitalised. As current events have 
demonstrated, these limits are not adequate to reﬂ  ect 
the risk inherent in large systemically important 
ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms.
3|6 Other  measures 
to limit systemic risk
In addition to the measures discussed above, there 
are a number of measures that could be taken fairly 
quickly to limit systemic risk. Over-the-counter 
(OTC) market contracts could be encouraged 
to trade on nationally recognised exchanges, 
originate-to-distribute models could be subject to 
greater disclosure requirements, and steps could be 
taken to reform the credit rating agencies.
CREDIT DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
One area of particular concern is the need to revisit the 
regulation and oversight of credit derivative markets. 
Credit derivatives provide investors with instruments 
and markets that can be used to create tremendous 
leverage and risk concentration without any means 
for monitoring the trail of exposure created by these 
instruments. For example, in the years leading up to 
the crisis, an individual ﬁ  rm could take a security 
from a pool of loans and, through the OTC markets 
for credit default swaps (CDS), leverage that debt 
many times in individual CDS contracts. At the same 
time, the debt could be referenced in CDS Index 
contracts created by OTC dealers, thus creating 
additional exposure to that debt. If the referenced 
security defaults, its bond holders will likely lose 
some fraction its par value, but CDS holders would 
face losses that are many times that amount.
12  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 created a new supervisory framework —known as Prompt Corrective Action or PCA— that links 
enforcement actions to the level of capital held by a bank. PCA represents an attempt to provide a timely and nondiscretionary trigger for supervisory actions.
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Events have shown that the CDS markets are a 
source of systemic risk. The market for CDS was 
originally set up as an inter-bank market to exchange 
credit risk without selling the underlying loans, but 
it has since expanded massively to include hedge 
funds, insurance companies, municipalities, public 
pension funds and other ﬁ  nancial institutions. The 
CDS market has expanded to include OTC index 
products that are so actively traded that they spawned 
a Chicago Board of Trade futures market contract. 
CDS markets are an important tool for hedging credit 
risk, but they also create leverage and can multiply 
underlying credit risk losses. Because there are 
relatively few CDS dealers, absent adequate risk 
management practices and safeguards, CDS markets 
can also create counterparty risk concentrations that 
are opaque to regulators and ﬁ  nancial institutions.
OTC contracts should be encouraged to trade on 
nationally regulated exchanges with centralised clearing 
and settlement systems, similar in character to those 
of the futures and equity option exchange markets.13 
The regulation of the contracts that remain OTC-traded 
should be subject to supervision by a national regulator 
with jurisdiction to promulgate rules and standards 
regarding sound risk management practices, including 
those needed to manage counterparty credit risk and 
collateral requirements, uniform close-out practices, 
trade conﬁ  rmation and reporting standards, and other 
regulatory and public reporting standards that will 
need to be established to improve market transparency. 
For example, OTC dealers could be required to report 
selected trade information in a Trade Reporting and 
Compliance Engine (TRACE)-style system, which 
would be made publicly available.14 OTC dealers and 
exchanges could also be required to report information 
on large exposures and risk concentrations to a 
regulatory authority. This could be modeled in much 
the same way as futures exchanges regularly report 
qualifying exposures to the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission. The reporting system would 
need to provide information on concentrations in 
both short and long positions.
THE ORIGINATE-TO-DISTRIBUTE BUSINESS MODEL 
One of the most important factors driving this ﬁ  nancial 
crisis has been the decline in value, liquidity and 
underlying collateral performance of a wide swath 
of previously highly rated asset-backed securities. 
In 2008, over 221,000 rated tranches of private-label 
asset-backed securitisations were downgraded. This has 
resulted in a widespread loss of conﬁ  dence in agency 
credit ratings for securitised assets, and bank and 
investor write-downs on their holdings of these assets.
Many of these previously highly rated securities 
were never traded in secondary markets, and were 
subject to little or no public disclosure about the 
characteristics and ongoing performance of the 
underlying collateral. Financial incentives for 
short-term revenue appear to have driven the creation 
of large volumes of highly rated securitisation 
products, with insufﬁ  cient attention to due diligence, 
and insufficient recognition of the risks being 
transferred to investors. Moreover, some aspects of the 
US regulatory framework may have encouraged banks 
and other institutional investors in the belief that a 
highly rated security is, by deﬁ  nition, of minimal risk.
Today, in a variety of policy-making groups 
around the world, there is consideration of ways 
to correct the incentives that led to the failure of 
the originate-to-distribute model. One area of focus 
relates to disclosure. For example, rated securitisation 
tranches could be subject to a requirement for 
disclosure of detailed loan-level characteristics and 
regular performance reports. Over the long term, 
liquidity and confidence might be improved if 
secondary market prices and volumes of asset-backed 
securities were reported on some type of system 
analogous to the TRACE-style report that now 
captures such data on corporate bonds.
Over the longer term, a more sustainable 
originate-to-distribute model might result if 
originators were required to retain some form of 
explicit exposure to the assets sold. This idea has been 
endorsed by the G30 and is being actively explored by 
the European Commission. Some in the United States 
have noted that there are implementation challenges 
to this idea, such as whether issuers should be 
prevented from hedging their exposure to their 
retained interests. Acknowledging these issues and 
correcting the problems in the originate-to-distribute 
model is very important, and some form of retention 
requirement that goes beyond the past practices of 
the industry should continue to be explored.
13 See  G30  report.
14  TRACE is a vehicle that facilitates the mandatory reporting of OTC secondary market transactions in eligible ﬁ  xed income securities. Broker/dealers have an 
obligation to report transactions in corporate bonds to TRACE. 
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CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM 
The FDIC generally agrees with the Group of 
30 recommendation that regulatory policies with 
regard to Nationally Recognised Securities Rating 
Organisations (NRSROs) and the use of their ratings 
should be reformed. Regulated entities should 
conduct independent evaluations of the credit 
risk products in which they are investing. NRSROs 
should evaluate the risk of potential losses from the 
full range of risk factors, including liquidity risk 
and price volatility. Regulators should examine the 
incentives imbedded in the current business models 
of NRSROs. For example, an important strand of work 
within the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
relates to the creation of operational standards for 
the use of ratings-based capital requirements. In the 
future, capital requirements should not give banks 
incentives to rely blindly on favorable agency credit 
ratings. Preconditions for the use of ratings-based 
capital requirements should ensure that investors 
and regulators have ready access to the loan-level data 
underlying the securities, and that an appropriate 
level of due diligence has been performed.
4| CONSUMER PROTECTION
There can no longer be any doubt about the link 
between protecting consumers from abusive products 
and practices and the safety and soundness of the 
ﬁ  nancial system. Products and practices that strip 
individual and family wealth undermine the foundation 
of the economy. As the current crisis demonstrates, 
increasingly complex ﬁ  nancial products combined 
with frequently opaque marketing and disclosure 
practices result in problems not just for consumers, 
but for institutions and investors as well.
To protect consumers from potentially harmful 
ﬁ  nancial products, a case has been made for a new 
independent ﬁ  nancial product safety commission 
independent of regulatory and supervisory authorities 
—a variation of the twin peaks regulatory model. 
Certainly, more must be done to protect consumers. 
The creation of a new entity to establish consistent 
consumer protection standards for banks and 
non-banks should include the perspective of bank 
regulators as well as non-bank enforcement ofﬁ  cials. 
It is important to ensure that consumer protection 
activities are aligned and integrated with other bank 
supervisory information, resources, and expertise, 
and that enforcement of consumer protection rules 
for banks be left to bank regulators.
In the United States, the current system allows bank 
regulators to take a comprehensive view of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions from both a consumer protection and 
safety-and-soundness perspective. Because of this, 
risks to consumers are closely linked with and 
informed by a broader understanding of other risks 
in ﬁ  nancial institutions. Likewise, assessments of 
other risks, including safety and soundness, beneﬁ  t 
from knowledge of basic principles, trends, and 
emerging issues related to consumer protection. 
If consumer protection regulation is separated 
from other regulation and supervision, it would 
become more difﬁ  cult for each party to gather 
the information that is necessary to effectively 
perform their respective functions.
Policy development must be closely coordinated 
and reﬂ  ect a broad understanding of institutions’ 
management, operations, policies, and practices. 
Placing consumer protection policy-setting activities in 
a separate organisation, apart from existing expertise 
and examination infrastructure, could ultimately result 
in less effective protections for consumers.
However, if a separate, independent ﬁ  nancial product 
safety commission is implemented, it should leverage 
the resources, experience, and legislative power of the 
existing regulatory authorities to enforce regulations 
related to institutions under their supervision and 
include principals from the bank regulatory agencies 
on the commission’s board. Such a commission should 
be required to submit periodic reports to Congress on 
the effectiveness of the consumer protection activities 
of the commission and the bank regulators.
Whether a new commission is created, it is essential 
that there be uniform standards for ﬁ  nancial products 
whether they are offered by banks or non-banks. 
These standards must apply across all jurisdictions and 
issuers, otherwise gaps create competitive pressures 
to reduce standards, as we saw with mortgage lending 
standards. Clear standards also permit consistent 
enforcement that protects consumers and the broader 
ﬁ  nancial system.
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Finally, it is time to examine curtailing federal 
preemption of state consumer protection laws in the 
United States. Federal preemption of state laws means 
that federally chartered institutions are not bound by 
state law. It was seen as a way to improve efﬁ  ciencies 
for ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms who argued that it lowered costs 
for consumers. While that may have been true in the 
short run, it has now become clear that abrogating 
sound state laws, particularly regarding consumer 
protection, created an opportunity for regulatory 
arbitrage that frankly resulted in a “race-to-the-bottom” 
mentality. Creating a “ﬂ  oor” for consumer protection, 
based on either appropriate state or federal law, rather 
than the current system that establishes a ceiling on 
protections would signiﬁ  cantly improve consumer 
protection. Perhaps reviewing the existing web of 
state and federal laws related to consumer protections 
and choosing those most appropriate for the “ﬂ  oor” 
could be one of the initial priorities for a ﬁ  nancial 
products safety commission.
The current ﬁ  nancial crisis demonstrates the need for changes in the resolution and supervision of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, especially those that are systemically important to the ﬁ  nancial system. The choices are 
complex, made more so by the fact that we are trying to address problems while the whirlwind of economic 
problems continues to engulf us. While the need for some reforms is obvious, such as a legal framework for 
resolving systemically important institutions, others are less clear and we would encourage a thoughtful, 
deliberative approach.
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